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"Perversions are never what they seem to be." This statement is
inscribed on the pillow from which the central character, Eve
(brilliantly acted by Tilda Swinton), rises in the opening sequence of
Susan Streitfeld's 1996 film Female Perversions. Inspired by Louise J.
Kaplan's 1991 book by the same name, Streitfeld fearlessly takes up the
vicissitudes of gender, sex and perversion. For Kaplan, "perversions
[...] are as much pathologies of gender role identity as they are
pathologies of sexuality"(14), and Streitfeld's intervention is to stage
their confounding in the figure of Eve. I plan to look first at Kaplan's
project in Female Perversions, and then offer an alternate theory of
women and perversion - via Teresa de Lauretis' The Practice ofLove -
in order to locate Kaplan's work within a particular context.
Streitfeld's Female Perversions both follows and departs from Kaplan's
in ways which complicate the latter. At its most compelling,
Streitfeld's film performs a kind of "symptomatic" reading of Kaplan's
text, one which exposes its gaps, limits and overdeterminations. What
Streitfeld does with Kaplan I hope to do with Streitfeld: what,
precisely, overdetermines her film? Streitfeld's film exemplifies the
very problem which this issue of Tessera takes up: what, exactly, is the
status of the relay between "feminism" and "self-help"?
Kaplan's text turns on a particular argument about women and
masquerade, one which bears an uncanny resemblance to that which
Joan Riviere puts forth in her 1929 "Womanliness as a Masquerade."
Kaplan suggests that "in the female perversions a display ofa
stereotypical femininity acts as the disguise for what a woman
experiences as a forbidden masculine striving"(173). Unfortunately,
Kaplan's weighty study (over five hundred pages of case studies,
anecdotal evidence, explanations and explications) can be distilled into
the two most contested words in the Freudian lexicon: penis envy. A
woman's desire for the phallus - its signifiers - is Kaplan's guarantee
against what she refers to as the "myth of primary femininity." That
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women want what men have is, for Kaplan, an argument against those
who "would assign women some biologically determined, innate
femininity"(189). Kaplan fails to recognize that the very "myth of
primary femininity" which she impugns she herself reproduces: if
women have no "innate femininity" then how is it that "striving" is a
property of masculinity? Moreover, Kaplan clearly sees no need to call
into question the very notion of "penis envy" as such, nor, by
extension, the category of perversion. In fact, Kaplan's entire
discussion of women and perversion is overdetermined by the
explanatory force of penis envy as that which both conditions and
limits her discourse. Most disturbing, perhaps, is that the exemplary
subject of female perversion in Freud - the female invert - is absent
in Kaplan; rather, the category of female perversion is displaced
entirely onto heterosexual women. In Kaplan, the subject of lesbian
desire is not only insufficiently accounted for - as it is in Freud - but
erased and effaced altogether.
Teresa de Lauretis' The Practice ofLove similarly articulates a
theory of women and perversion, one which also operates within the
terms of psychoanalytic theory, but to radically different effect than
Kaplan's. Re-reading Freud's theory of the perversions, de Lauretis
argues for"a model of perverse desire based on Freud's notion of
disavowal and an unorthodox reading of fetishism"(257). IfKaplan
forecloses on the possibility of theorizing the subject of a female desire
that is not explicitly heterosexual, then de Lauretis' project is precisely
the recuperation of psychoanalytic theory for thinking such a
possibility. For de Lauretis, the aim and object of female - specifically
lesbian - desire is not the phallus, but, rather, the "fantasmatic female
body":
The castration complex rewrites in the symbolic as lack of a penis
what is a primary narcissistic loss of body-image, a lack of being
that threatens the imaginary matrix of the body-ego. On the
disavowal of this lack depend what I call perverse desire and the
formation of a fetishlike object or sign that both lures and signifies
the subject's desire, at once displacing and resignifying the wished-
for female body (xviii).
I offer de Lauretis simply as a counterpoint, and a position from which
to critique Kaplan.
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I want now to consider Streitfeld's Female Perversions apropos of
Kaplan's. The citation from Kaplan's text which appears before the
credit sequence signals Streitfeld's debt to Kaplan, and, not
surprisingly, a desire to follow Kaplan's example. Streitfeld's film does
indeed live up to Kaplan's example, and, inevitably, exceeds it. Eve's
very name invokes the original scene of female perversion: the biblical
Eve donned her best fig leaf in order to persuade Adam to transgress
the original prohibition. In the film, we see Eve begin to prepare for her
interview with the governor (she's vying for a judgeship) by reclaiming
her lucky suit from the dry cleaners. The morning of the interview,
Eve, preoccupied with her extravagant preening ritual, only belatedly
notices that her sister Madelyn has "borrowed" the coveted suit to
wear to her own dissertation defence. Eve must wear another suit (one
with a loose thread) and she blames Madelyn for what she perceives is
an interview gone awry. This central narrative thread is a careful
replication of Kaplan's thesis. Eve performs her femininity - to excess
- in order to"disguise" her "masculine striving." Early in the film Eve
delivers a summation in a courtroom and our gaze is focalized through
the various men who watch her - or more precisely parts of her - as
she speaks. The camera cuts from a part of Eve's body to the face of one
of the men in the room, and then back to a different part of her body.
Eve alternates between placing one hand seductively on her hip, and
clenching her hands into fists for emphasis as she speaks about the
need for "control" and "domination." She wins the case. In terms of
Kaplan, Eve's "perversion" - her desire to be an arbiter of the law, a
distributor of justice - is"disguised" by the fantasy of seduction that
she performs before the exemplary figure of the law: the courtroom. In
a sense, Eve fucks (with) the law in order to prevent being fucked by
the law.
Streitfeld's film exceeds Kaplan's text in interesting and
important ways. A central scene in the film is one in which a young
woman on the brink of adolescence, Ed, is subject to a lesson in
femininity from her flashy aunt. A resistant subject at best, Ed picks at
the skin around her nails while her aunt performs a kind of dance-of-
the-seven-veils. "You can learn to be feminine too - it doesn't come
naturally - you have to work at it" Ed's aunt informs her, while
swaying to music. Eve observes Ed's rite of passage between gulps of a
potent drink. Ed's mother, Emma, who is a bridal dressmaker and thus
highly symbolic in Kaplan's parlance, returns home depressed from a
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date for which she left in a state of sheer elation. Emma joins in the
dance, her eyes shut, and moaning, as Ed's aunt continues to instruct
Ed: "Watch closely - if you do this well all men will want you - it's all
about power - you've got to make him believe you've got what he
desires - you've got to be everybody's dream - everything to
everyone - you've got to erase yourself - you've got to become
generic." "Archetypal," supplies Emma. This scene gestures toward
Kaplan's figure of the "woman as masquerade," but it also works the
productive tension ofJudith Butler's recasting of woman-as-
masquerade in terms of the "performativity"'of all gender, not simply
femininity. Butler asks "what precisely is masked by masquerade."
Is masquerade the consequence of a feminine desire that must be
negated, and, thus, made into a lack that, nevertheless, must
appear in some way? Is masquerade the consequence of a denial of
this lack for the purpose of appearing to be the Phallus? Does
masquerade construct femininity as the reflection of the Phallus in
order to disguise bisexual possibilities that otherwise might
disrupt the seamless construction of a heterosexualized
femininity? Does masquerade, as Uoan] Riviere suggests,
transform aggression and the fear of reprisal into seduction and
flirtation? Does it serve primarily to conceal or repress a pregiven
femininity, a feminine desire which would establish an
insubordinate alterity to the masculine subject and expose the
necessary failure of masculinity? Or is masquerade the means by
which femininity itself is first established, the exclusionary practice
of identity formation in which the masculine is effectively
excluded and instated as outside the boundaries of a feminine
gendered position? (48)
I cite Butler at length because she - better than I - articulates the very
questions which Kaplan fails to consider, questions which have been
around as long as Joan Riviere's "Womanliness as a Masquerade."
Butler's (now well-known) intervention is to suggest that nothing lies
behind the masquerade; gender has no referent, but is rather an effect
of "the repeated stylization of the body" (33).
Streitfeld's film takes up the question of gender identity, but
rather than insist on Kaplan's trope of woman-as-masquerade,
Streitfeld seems, at times, less interested in the latent content of gender
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performance - the perversion behind the performance - than in the
performativity of gender itself. Moments before Eve pulls up to a red
light, an elderly woman approaches a bench upon which is
emblazoned the slogan "In perversion there is no freedom, only a rigid
conformity to a gender stereotype." The woman sits down and
proceeds to apply her lipstick just as Eve, now at the light, reapplies her
own lipstick while glancing in the rearview mirror. The scene evokes a
sense of continuity and inheritance: the iterability of gender, of
femininity, in this instance, is a practice of history. What is most
compelling about the film, though, is precisely the separation of gender
from perversion, a recognition of their very non-identity. Streitfeld's
film works on gender, and, in turn, demotes perversion to a state of
interminable affect. Perversion is not a determination of gender in the
film (as it is in Kaplan's text), but, rather, an effect. The best of the film
stages a kind of Lacanian/Zizekean "Che vuoi?" in which we see Eve
repeatedly fail to be interpellated as a gendered subject into ideology.
Most memorable is the scene in which Eve, arriving at work after an
argument with her sister Madelyn, is greeted by a male colleague with
"Hey, that's not the right attitude!" A startled and bewildered Eve
responds "It's not?" The scene is wonderful for its dramatization of
what Slavoj ZiZek, following Jacques Lacan, refers to as the hysteric's
question: "Why am I what you're telling me that I am?" OB). Eve, in
another moment of failed interpellation, leaves the dry cleaners in a
state of utter distraction. Upon getting into her car a man to whom she
has just given money remarks, "Hey, lady, can you do something for
me? Stay as beautiful as you are right now." The expression on Eve's
face indicates that she is not entirely certain he is speaking to her, and
she stands looking confused for a few moments before getting into her
car. We see the interpellative process in slow motion: we bear witness
to the moment between Eve's "hailing" (in Althusser's sense) and her
insertion into an ideological field as a gendered subject.
"Perversions are never what they seem to be." In Streitfeld's
Female Perversions, perversion is never quite itself. Sometimes it
appears in its negative form: hysteria. De Lauretis, for example,
rereads Freud's theory of the perversions for their negativity, while
Freud himself explicitly positions perversions in relation to neuroses:
"neuroses are, so to say, the negative of the perversions" (80). The film shifts
the focus - and by extension the locus - of its critique often enough
that, it too, asks the hysteric's question: "Why am I what you're telling
102 . Tessera
me that I am?" How else to explain the specious narrative turn - a
narrative conversion of sorts - that occurs after Eve's interview? The
interview with the governor begins to unravel when he asks first about
her family, and subsequently about why she has never married. Eve
berates herself in the parking lot after the interview: "What a stupid
idiot I am! Why didn't I say I was engaged?" And, 'Tm going to kill
her! [Madelyn]." What follows is an intense encounter between the
two sisters which ends when Madelyn drives off in Eve's car, leaving
Eve to collapse, exhausted, on Madelyn's bathroom floor. This is the
scene of Eve's breakdown, one which is triggered by the questions she
must answer - and cannot - about her family. When Madelyn
returns, she and Eve reminisce about the past, and especially about
their relationship with their father. They watch together what each has
viewed separately: a home movie of the entire family relaxing in the
backyard, captured when the sisters are young girls. It is the scene of
Oedipal structuring and psychic formation. The movie is projected
onto the wall in Madelyn's room, upon which hangs a large
photograph of a Latina woman with, what Ed has told Eve, are live
iguanas on her head. A kind of palimpsest, this figure of maternal
forbearance and power (also a problematic figure of the "exotic")
comes to efface the faded and dated Oedipal scenario (the film within
the film). Earlier in the film, Eve laughs derisively as she reads
Madelyn's dissertation, which, Emma tells Eve, is about"a group of
women in Mexico who have all the power. They're all fat. That's what
happens in a matriarchy."
No longer scornful, the various objects and artifacts which are
strewn across Madelyn's room - signifiers of an"other" scene of
psychic structuring - come to haunt and intrigue Eve. It is this subtle
shift in the film which I would like to mark. The film is at certain
moments playful and irreverent with what might be called self-help, or
recovery discourse. When Eve goes to her female lover - a
psychiatrist - she settles herself on the couch, and looks pleadingly at
her lover, who tells her that she is a "deeply compulsive, neurotic,
codependent woman, who probably loves too much, or too little." A
melodramatic Eve responds, ''I'm so glad someone understands me!"
Later, as Eve aggressively seduces her, she tells her that she has no use
for psychology because "nothing's concrete. I prefer the law. Black
and white. Obey the rules. Guilty or not guilty." (Incidentally, this
moment resonates with a previous one in which Eve, spurned by her
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male lover, apologizes to him as he walks out of the room, utterly
indifferent to her presence: "I know I shouldn't expect to be able to
change the rules. You go ahead. I'll be fine.") The film loses this
irreverence after Eve's breakdown, a scene of enormous loss: a loss of
paternal law. A kind of rhetoric of recovery comes to fill in the
narrative gap or lack which is opened up by this loss. In the final
moments of the film, Eve leaves Madelyn's place early in the morning,
only to return to claim the picture of the Latina woman from Madelyn's
wall. This figure of the maternal (now invested as a kind of fetish-
object, in de Lauretis' sense) comes to replace the Oedipal law of the
father. Upon leaving the house this second time, Eve sees Ed walking
off in the distance, and follows her. She is led to a kind of ceremonial
and burial site: Ed has scattered her mother's naked mannequins
around and staged an eerie graveyard scene. In a rare moment of
compassion, Eve cradles Ed's head in her lap, and slowly rocks her
while Ed cries. The film ends with this image, one which is rather
heavy-handed in its deployment of recovery rhetoric. The same Eve
who has nothing but laughter and scorn for arm-chair psychology,
here, we are to believe, is desperate to recover her inner child? The
very figures which are sent up earlier in the film, and form the basis of
the trenchant critique of gender identity, become the terms upon which
the film achieves its - rather disingenuous - narrative resolution.
Indeed, perversions are never what they seem to be. Why must the loss
of paternal law, a crack in the symbolic order, be recuperated as a
"recovery" of the (lost) maternal? I'll give de Lauretis the last word:
"perverse desire is sustained on fantasy scenarios that restage the loss
and recovery of a fantasmatic female body."
Even when they take the form of a return to the mother - and thus
may appear as ineffectual political nostalgia for a non-Oedipal,
prepatriarchal world, or as a regressive retreat from the "realities"
of sexual conflict [... ] to a nurturing, anodyne, maternal body - the
fetishized scenarios of an empowered and exclusive femininity
have less to do with mothering or with the mother's body as such
than with restaging the subject's own loss and recovery of the
female body (265).
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